


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ABSTRACT

Reasons for underutilization of social research in public policy-making and the complexity of the concept of utilization are discussed. Among the factors affecting underutilization are the limitations of the social sciences and shortcomings of specific policy research. A common explanation of underutilization is the allegedly long-established neglect on the part of government of the potential contributions of social research. Another limit on research utilization is the fact that time is often a very scarce resource in policy-making. Additionally, research is also costly; the fragmented character of policy-making works to the disadvantage of research-based knowledge; and sophisticated social research methodologies are difficult for policy-makers to assess. Underutilization or nonutilization of social research is also thought to be due to the differences in values, language, reward systems, and professional affiliations between policy-makers and researchers. It is noted that social research is almost always used for partisan purposes in the policy process, and that the role of research can only be understood within the context of the entire policy process. (SW)

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SOCIAL RESEARCH AND PUBLIC

POLICY-MAKING: AN OVERVIEW

by

Rune I.T. Premfors*

YALE HIGHER EDUCATION RESEARCH GROUP
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Introduction

During the 1960s social science turned into "big science," an important social institution in its own right. A necessary condition for this growth was in most countries a heavy support from government. And, not surprisingly, government wanted something in return; its demand for useful social research grew correspondingly. In many areas of public policy, social research--particularly in the form of program evaluation--became increasingly regarded as a necessary aspect of the policy-making process. Undoubtedly this development was most pronounced in the United States. There, to use Horowitz's words, in "strictly quantitative terms, the relationship between social science and public policy can only be described as a booming success."¹

And, in general, the social sciences have become increasingly policy-oriented:²

As of about 1970, an exciting new development occurred in nearly all the social sciences. That development involved a substantially more widespread and explicit attempt to apply the concepts, methods, and findings of the social sciences to important policy problems. The development has manifested itself in many ways. These ways have included an increasing list of relevant journals, organizations, articles, books, book series, convention papers, conference themes, courses, schools, job openings, foundation grants, and summer institutes. Causes or facilitators of the development include new applicable methodologies and data sources, various social movements, interdisciplinary activities, a near saturation of quantitative methods to non-policy-relevant topics . . .

(Admittedly, government demand for the products of social science has only

been one among several "causes or facilitators" -- but you cannot leave it out as is largely done in the quotation above.)

Although many aspects of the relationship between social research and government have been discussed for decades, there was, until recently, a conspicuous lack of serious research on the topic. And a large share of the thin scholarly literature that existed did not live up to the requirements of a disinterested posture -- which most social researchers recommend as proper in the study of other social institutions. Blatant overselling of the products of social science and emotional warnings against government interference have characterized even many purportedly scholarly writings in the area.³

Since the late 1960s the situation has, however, improved considerably. Serious books and articles are being published in a steady stream. A few major empirical research efforts have been reported, and still more are well under way.⁴ Again, very little seems to have been accomplished outside the United States. There, on the other hand, there are clear signs of a near-established research field with the necessary "invisible college" and also, from 1979, a specialized journal (Knowledge Creation, Diffusion, Utilization; published by Sage).

In view of the high level of expectations concerning the use of social research in public policy-making -- nurtured by researchers and government officials alike -- disappointments were bound to occur. In spite of the considerable investments in policy-oriented research, it is widely felt in the 1970s that the actual impact on the formation of public policies has been relatively slight. To be sure, exceptions are cited in the literature. The use of macro-economic theory in government decision-making is perhaps the most frequently used example. Nobody seriously questions the importance of Keynesian theory to economic policy in many countries or, for that matter,

of the "monetarist counterrevolution" in recent years.⁵ Other areas where policy makers seem to have utilized social research in decision making include education, mental health, and security policy.⁶ The more intensive empirical studies have also shown that research is used, albeit somewhat erratically and often in unintended ways.⁷

But overall the situation is perceived as very unsatisfactory and this has prompted a plethora of reform proposals concerning almost every facet of the problem.⁸ The aim of this paper is not, however, to discuss the many proposed remedies but, rather, to provide an overview of the more scholarly contributions towards a diagnosis. Within this context, I shall further limit the presentation to two themes which seem to have been pursued with particular intensity in the literature: (1) explanations of underutilization, and (2) the complexity of the concept of utilization.

Explaining Underutilization

Altogether an impressive number of factors have been advanced to explain under- or nonutilization of social research in public policy-making. In the sequel I will only mention the most general ones. Although they overlap, the following categories are used to impose some order in the presentation: (a) factors primarily related to research; (b) factors related to policy making; and (c) what has been termed "two-community" theory.

Research. The explanatory factors concerned with the research end of the research-government relationship range from what is seen as inherent epistemological limitations of the social sciences to specific shortcomings of particular pieces of policy research.

In the former vein, the arguments are well known from general discussions

of the status of social science as a science. The inability of social scientists to develop bodies of verified knowledge similar to the ideal as posed by the natural sciences, the argument goes, strongly impairs the application of social research to policy problems. The relative success of economics, but also psychology, in this regard hinges on the fact that these are virtually the only branches of social science where law-like, scientific propositions exist.⁹

Although advances in methodology are indisputable, it is often noted that most social science disciplines, including economics, have seen growing internal conflicts over basic concepts since the 1960s. The consensus on what constitutes the proper concerns of each discipline is now even more limited than it used to be.¹⁰

While some writings stop at this point, seemingly awaiting future advances in the social sciences, others argue that there is too much "scientism" in these expectations. Since social problems are "soft," "undisciplined," "extremely complex," etc., the ideal of the natural sciences is false and even dangerous.¹¹

The problem of Werthfreiheit is of course also relevant here. Most authors in the area of research utilization seem to agree with the statement that "the work of social scientists is inevitably suffused at some level with normative and policy content."¹² The big divide is that between a large majority who argue that Werthfreiheit is a goal to strive for even under present social and political circumstances, and a smaller number who defy this strategy as hypocrisy, as inevitably implying a support of established powers.¹³

In a more narrow vein, many authors have pointed to shortcomings in the current practice of policy-oriented research as partial explanations of underutilization. The development toward increasingly narrow specialties

and the lack of genuine attempts at interdisciplinary research is often said to be particularly detrimental. Social problems typically cut across disciplines. To some scholars more interdisciplinary work is insufficient: a new discipline is necessary -- policy sciences.¹⁴

The actual quality of policy research is also said to have been low. For example, a survey of a large number of program evaluations in the United States found that many simply ignored some of the basic canons of research methodology.¹⁵

Many products of social research are also said to be imbued with the political values dominating among social researchers, i.e. in the U.S. context overwhelmingly liberal. When their pet programs are not implemented, these liberal researchers are heard to complain that policy makers ignore relevant research findings.¹⁶

It is also commonplace in the literature to note the prevalence of fads and fashions in current social research.¹⁷ In a similar vein, it is frequently observed that social research is sometimes too quick to adapt to changing realities. According to Aaron, an examination of three major policy areas in the United States shows that¹⁸

. . . the parallel between development of social science and the views of scholars, on the one hand, and developments of public policy during this period, on the other, was striking in each of these three areas. But in many cases, the findings of social research seemed to come after, rather than before, changes in policy, which suggests that political events may influence scholars more than research influences policy.

Public policy-making. A common explanation of underutilization is the allegedly long-established neglect on the part of government of the potential contributions of social research. Once the future pay-offs of investments in policy research are fully appreciated, all this will change, and government will find the new instrument indispensable.¹⁹

In more sophisticated writings, however, several features of public policy-making are seen as limits on research utilization. There is, for example, the fact that time is often a very scarce resource in policy making:²⁰

Policy-making is not an event. It is a process . . . During the various stages, policy-making does not usually wait for relevant knowledge to become available. Under the pressure of events and constituencies, legislation is passed, programs are started, regulations and guidelines are written, and funds are authorized, appropriated, and spent, whether or not relevant analysis and research findings are available. Indeed, the process is often reversed: the systematic accumulation of knowledge may not begin until policies and programs are enacted.

Even if sufficient time was available the costliness of research (in monetary terms) may of course be prohibitive as well.

As in research, fads and fashions are an important aspect of the dynamics of public policy-making:²¹

Each social problem rises into public view, captures center stage for a time, and fades away to be replaced by the next fashionable issue (. . .). Each problem area, such as health or education, experiences alternating periods of public concern and public neglect.

Consequently, research initiated in an area when public interest was at a peak may be completely ignored when results are reported.

The fragmented character of policy making in many areas also works to the disadvantage of research-based knowledge. As Lindblom warns:²²

One is tempted to think that policy is made through a sequence of steps . . . such as (a) preliminary appraisal . . . of the problem; (b) identification of goals or objectives; (c) canvassing of possible policies to achieve the goals; and (d) choice or decision. This way of looking at policy making is useful for some purposes, but it tends to view policy making as though it were the product of one governing mind, which is clearly not the case. It fails to evoke or suggest the distinctively political aspects of policy making, its apparent disorder and the consequent strikingly different ways in which policies emerge.

A policy is sometimes the outcome of a political compromise among policy makers, none of whom had in mind quite the problem to which the agreed policy is a solution. Sometimes politics spring from new opportunities, not from "problems" at all. And sometimes policies are not decided upon, but nevertheless "happen."

Nobody should be surprised to learn that centralization of policy making is an often encountered proposal in the area of social R & D policy.


The often adversary character of policy making was mentioned by Lindblom as an aspect of fragmentation or "disorder," but is worth to single out as being of particular importance to research utilization. As put by Lynn:²³

Policy decisions are made through bargaining and compromise by participants with widely dissimilar perspectives. From the point of view of participants, policy-relevant research is research that helps them carry out their roles and achieve goals they consider important.

Finally, there are of course what Weiss has called cognitive limits on government utilization of social research. For example, policy makers often have a hard time trying to specify the nature of the research that would be useful to them, and experience even more difficulties in depicting exact data and statistical relationships. Furthermore, the increasingly sophisticated methodologies of social research make it often impossible for policy makers to assess the value of research reports.²⁴

Two-community theory. Here the argument is similar to that made by C.P. Snow in The Two Cultures to explain the rift between natural scientists and humanists. Under- or nonutilization of social research is due to the differences in values, language, reward systems, professional affiliations, etc., between policy makers and researchers.

Price has identified what is probably the most basic dimension in this regard. He names it "the spectrum from truth to power." He argues that it is possible and fruitful to place four "estates" as he calls them along this spectrum:




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But neither ever exists in its pure form.

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illustrated in this simple figure by Packenham (here amended somewhat):



In other words, the closer the estate is to the truth pole the more freedom it should be allowed. Consequently, the closer to the exercise of power the less an estate should be permitted to organize as a self-governing corporate entity. Obviously this is a fairly traditional plea for academic freedom as well as responsible government. However, it also implies a clear limitation on expert power. "Power" is as necessary and legitimate as "truth" in democratic politics.²⁷

Many authors have pointed out that the two systems are guided by different conceptions of rationality. Ezrahi has highlighted the contrasts in this regard by showing how "internal" scientific rationality is transformed into a professional ideology when applied to public affairs:²⁸

According to this professional ideology, science is regarded as the highest embodiment of human rationality, and the social diffusion and application of scientific knowledge are conceived as means for the realization of the cherished social goal of enhancing rationality in human affairs . . . (T)he rationality of scientific knowledge is deemed a model or paradigm for rationality in human affairs . . .

By committing this "fallacy of misplaced rationality," scientists tend to overlook, for example, that the appeal to scientific knowledge as a basis for public policy-making implies "a politically loaded" choice of an approach which expresses a preference for judging actions by "their instrumental rather than intrinsic values." Furthermore the fallacy²⁹

. . . obscures the fact that the precision, simplicity, and consensus found in the work of science depend on the narrowness of its normative perspective. Insofar as it encourages scientists to overlook the operation of a specific "political logic" in the domain of public affairs, it leads them to believe that the fulfillments of the requirements of rationality and objectivity, which renders scientific modes of perceiving and manipulating reality compelling in the context of scientific investigation, is sufficient to make them compelling also in the context of public affairs. In line with this fallacy, the (professional ideology) tends to encourage scientists to believe that the diffusion of scientific theories or research results in the larger society necessarily also serves the cause of enhancing the rationality and objectivity of public discourse on social problems.

A further difference of importance concerns the reward systems in the two realms of science and public policy. It has, for example, been pointed out that at present the career advancement of university-based social scientists is almost entirely dependent on their status within a discipline which in turn almost completely hinges on published work in scholarly journals and books. By contrast the reward system of policy makers stresses organizational activity and accomplishment, compromising, and also adjustment to the party or agency line. Concerning publicity, Horowitz observes that while³⁰

. . . social scientists have a fetisch for publicizing their information, in part as a mechanism for professional advancement no less than as a definition of their essential role in society, the political branches of society have as their fetisch the protection of private documents and privileged information.

Furthermore, as already noted above, the two realms value time differently. Altogether these and other differences in the reward systems, makes it, according to Rein & White,³¹

. . . extremely difficult for an individual to retain his credibility in these two very different areas. The scientist who is too action-oriented loses his credibility in the same way that the politician who is too theory-oriented loses his. But the basic problem is not the ability or inability of an individual to wear two hats, but rather the incompatibility of science and politics: One trades in fact and the other in values.

In brief summary, many of the difficulties experienced in the efforts to utilize social research for public policy purposes stem from these fundamental intrinsic differences of the realms of science and politics as cultural systems.

Functions of Research in Public Policy-Making

A major preoccupation of scholars in the field has been, then, to explain underutilization of social research in public policy-making. A second major theme in the literature has concerned the concept of utilization itself. Most writings find that there are certainly many and varied forms of research use, some of which are "good," while others are "bad" or at least unintended.

Engineering versus enlightenment. In the effort at conceptualizing research use an insight of considerable interest has developed. As Weiss has put it in her introduction to the most complete collection of articles in the field:³²

Perhaps the major theme of this book is that the usual definition (of research utilization), the direct application of research findings to solve a specific problem, is not the common pattern . . . The ways that most social research is "used" are much more diffuse and circuitous.


The common way to develop this argument further has been to contrast two major functions or models of research utilization, the "engineering" and the "enlightenment" models. (Other proximate terms in use are "problem-solving," "decisionistic" or "instrumental" for the former, and "conceptual" for the latter.) Janowitz and Crawford & Biderman seem to have pioneered. About ten years ago Crawford & Biderman set out³³

. . . to show that perceptions of nonutility are, in considerable measure, consequences of the low correspondence of the engineering model to the actual uses that have been made of social science.


The mistake, they argued, was that of applying a model of research utilization suitable for the natural sciences and engineering technology to the social realm. This engineering model implied the application of "scientific generalizations and propositions to a few easily manipulable variables."³⁴ However, in very few circumstances in public policy-making are these conditions

met: the social sciences do rarely provide the scientific generalizations needed, and problems can seldom be solved through the manipulation of a small number of variables.

Weiss has diagrammed the engineering or problem-solving model in the following manner:³⁵



More precisely this is what she refers to as a "decision-driven model" of research use. An alternative formulation is the "knowledge-driven model" diagrammed as follows:



Here the process starts with an existing body of social science knowledge which "has thrown up an opportunity that can be capitalized on."³⁶

In a third formulation one may speak of an "interaction model" where "the process is not one of linear order from research to decision but a disorderly set of interconnections and back-and-forthness that defies neat diagrams."³⁷

What all these models of research utilization have in common is that they picture the use of research as primarily a contribution to specific instances of problem-solving. This may not be its major role, however:³⁸

Evidence suggests that government officials use research less to arrive at solutions than to orient themselves to problems. They use research to help them think about issues and define the problematics of a situation, to gain new ideas and new perspectives. They use research to help formulate problems and to set the agenda for future policy actions. And much of this is not deliberate, direct, and targeted, but a result of long-term percolation of social science concepts, theories, and findings into the climate of informed opinion.

The indirect and complex character of this enlightenment function of social research makes it difficult to discern and study empirically. A beginning has certainly been made, however, and several major studies have shown the existence of this function of research. Caplan et al found in their interviews with high-level federal officials in the United States that a very large proportion of the instances of research use mentioned by the respondents concerned "soft," conceptual knowledge from the social sciences rather than "hard," quantitative, research-specific data. The impact seems often to have occurred through the mass media or oral communication rather than through research reports.³⁹

Knorr in her study of research utilization in Austria started out in search of confirmation of the thesis that policy makers largely use research in a symbolic fashion to legitimize decisions already taken. She found some evidence to prove this but she was also impressed with the role that social science concepts seem to play in what she calls the "preparatory stages" of policy making.⁴⁰

Weiss et al have conducted a major study of research use in the mental health field in the United States which further elaborates the concept of enlightenment. Not only did they find that policy makers are significantly influenced by social science findings, but they were also able to show that, contrary to widespread expectations, many policy makers value "challenging research -- research that shakes things up and is not yet politically feasible . . ."⁴¹

Rich studied the use of public opinion data in several policy-making areas in the United States. His main conclusion was that, when used at all, this knowledge was used conceptually, not in an instrumental fashion.⁴²

Partisan use of research. Knowledge is often power and power is the currency of politics. Not surprisingly the literature finds that social research is used for partisan purposes in the policy-making process. And researchers often experience that their products are used as political ammunition. Sometimes they even find themselves being part of a more encompassing political strategy. The policy maker may, for example, have initiated a research project in order to delay action in the policy area (here the time-scale of research makes it particularly suitable), to provide arguments in favor of an already decided program (especially social experiments may effectively serve this purpose), or to discredit political opponents.⁴³

A further set of uses concern the immediate self-interest of those involved. Basic survival but also self-aggrandizement are probably important motive forces both among researchers and policy makers. Among the former the ambition may well be to one day be able to walk the corridors of power. Examples abound in recent years of social scientists successful in this regard. However, the arrival of social scientists to positions of power may of course not automatically be interpreted as increasing influence for social research.⁴⁴

Among the policy makers, officials and bureaus in charge of R & D programs within agencies or departments could be expected to favor the expansion of such programs. One of the many tactics used implies the mobilization of the most prestigious scholars available in favor of particular research activities.

As hinted at earlier some authors argue that the liberal ideology of most social researchers is reflected in their policy-relevant work. The overall effect of using research in policy making would consequently be to further liberal policies. Others, like a Habermas or a Gouldner, are convinced that the major function of research is to legitimize present

structures. The complex issues which are raised by such broad statements can certainly not be dealt with in detail here. Much is to be said, however, in favor of Lindblom's view that policy research virtually requires a loose ideological framework to begin with. Otherwise the number of alternative policies becomes too great.⁴⁵

But research may serve a conservative function in more subtle ways than through the political orientations of researchers as is shown in the work by Aaron and Cohen & Weiss. The gist of their argument is that policy-oriented research has furthered complexity in the perception of social problems. As put by Cohen & Weiss:⁴⁶

For the most part, the improvement of research on social policy does not lead to greater clarity about what to think or what to do; instead, it usually tends to produce a greater sense of complexity. This result is endemic to the research process. For what researchers understand by improvement in their craft leads not to greater consensus about research problems, methods, and interpretation of results, but to more variety in the ways problems are seen, more divergence in the way studies are carried out, and more controversy in the ways results are interpreted. It leads also to a more complicated view of problems and solutions, for the progress of research tends to reveal the inadequacy of accepted ideas about solving problems.

Aaron has reached similar conclusions in his recent study of the interaction between social research and public policy within the framework of the Great Society programs initiated in the early 1960s:⁴⁷

To the extent that R & E (research and experimentation) operates on general public opinion, defining and redefining the range of topics on which a layman feels there is sufficient consensus to act, conflicting research is bound to have a conservative effect. Only if one feels passionately that a problem is so urgent that some answer, even though it may be wrong, is better than none, will this effect be overcome.

(. . .)

The role that research and experimentation played in the demise of the simple faiths of the early 1960s was not accidental. The process by which R & E is created corrodes the kind of simple faiths on which political movements are built; this effect is particularly strong when, as in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the actions of political leaders tend to destroy those faiths and events make them implausible.

If government is an agent for good, one may tolerate actions of uncertain effectiveness; but if government is an agent for evil, or even morally neutral, only demonstrable beneficial actions will be tolerated. This corrosive role of R & E was obscured for a while because nearly all of it was produced by analysts who themselves held the simple faiths that underlay the goals of the War on Poverty and the Great Society When the passion waned, partly because of external events and partly because of frustration at the apparently mixed results of actual policies, the imperatives of the analytical process. won out.

If the issue at stake is political, then knowledge brought into the policy-making process inevitably becomes political knowledge. Its truth value is then a matter of faith and political expediency, not of scientific procedure.⁴⁸

Other functions of research. Research may serve other functions as well.

Some of them border on the enlightenment function. For example, social reporting in various forms (from the simplest routine statistics to the elaborate efforts in some countries at creating a coherent set of social indicators) has obviously been important in modifying policy makers' perceptions of what constitute social problems at a particular point in time.⁴⁹

Finally, it may well also be, as pointed out by Cohen & Lindblom, that social research has clearly negative functions: it may e.g. imply the waste of scarce resources or the creation of "noise" in the policy-making process.⁵⁰

Conclusions: Lessons for the Research Agenda

There exists, then, a thin but growing body of literature concerning the role of social research in public policy-making. It seems to be almost entirely confined to the United States, a fact which of course has left its imprint on the character of the research undertaken.⁵¹

To begin with, the chief theme pursued in the writings was possible explanations of underutilization. Almost everyone agreed on this general

diagnosis, and also that a large number of factors were important. Successively, however, this simple view of underutilization has been modified. A much more complex concept of research use is now recognized in most quarters. In particular it is realized that even if social research is underutilized, or perhaps not used at all, as a direct input in government decision-making, a more indirect and conceptual impact may often occur and in the long run be of greater importance. As we have seen, several empirical studies, starting out with widely different conceptualizations of research use, have all come across this so-called enlightenment function.

A first important lesson to be learned from the existing efforts is, then, that no serious research should be undertaken in the future without incorporating the notion of the enlightenment function of social research in the conceptual framework. Unless this is done, there is considerable risk that important research impacts on policy developments are not accounted for. The difficulties involved in tracing this function should not be underestimated, however. The conceptual effort has barely begun in this area. However, some authors have pointed to Kuhn's paradigms as a useful device.⁵² Blume has made a particularly interesting start by arguing that, briefly put, policy developments should be viewed as theory development. By doing this, we get a conceptual framework which is sufficiently open to the indirect and often historical character of research impact on social policies.⁵³

As we have also seen, social research is almost always used for partisan purposes in the policy process. There is no reason to be morally upset by this since it largely hinges on the nature of public policy-making. Just to cite a perfectly "objective" research finding is an act of partisanship if it supports or undermines a controversial policy. Consequently, the use of social research is overwhelmingly determined by the character of the policy

process. The idea that policy analysis in various forms will significantly reduce the role of "politics" in public policy-making seems largely false in this perspective. Research-based knowledge will probably always play a very minor role, and all expectations in the direction of "authoritativeness" for social research in any policy area must be viewed as unrealistic.⁵⁴

A second major lesson to be learned from the literature is, then the importance of adopting a policy-making perspective. The role of research can only be understood within the context of the entire policy process. To policy makers there are almost invariably alternatives to social research as a basis for decisions. Both for analytic understanding and for policy purposes it seems important to know more precisely where the process is, in Cherns' terms, permeable to research knowledge.⁵⁵

The literature on the policy-making process is by now quite extensive but also very inconclusive.⁵⁶ Numerous competing models exist side by side. The specific writings on the dynamics of public policy-making, sometimes referred to as the study of "policy cycles," are also growing in number. The insight is also spreading that policy processes vary systematically from one policy area to another.⁵⁷

In particular, the analysis of policy sector variation with regard to knowledge utilization should be pursued as a basis for conceptual development. In a recent and very stimulating article, Janet Weiss has illustrated the potential payoffs of this type of analysis. Staying close to available empirical information she identifies five aspects of sectoral policy-making which seem to be important to the explanation of the variation in social research utilization between policy areas:

(a) degree of centralization, (b) characteristics of policy makers, especially their training, (c) institutional histories and procedures,

(d) the nature of decisions in the area, and, finally, (e) the availability of alternative sources of information.⁵⁸ Other variables may prove to be equally worthy of consideration; undoubtedly, however, Janet Weiss has pointed to some of the most pertinent ones.

* * *

Whether improved analytical understanding of the knowledge-into-policy process (which must be the priority on the research agenda) will lead to better public policies concerning the utilization of social research (i.e. the priority on the policy agenda) is--as should be evident from what has been said in this paper--a very difficult question to answer. It would be foolish to rule out such an impact. But so far it seems as if the accomplishment has largely been of the kind pointed to earlier: the perceptions of the problems involved in applying social research to policy making have become more complex. It is not easy, for example, to recommend particular policy measures on the basis of the insight about the enlightenment function.

NOTES

- ¹ Horowitz (1975), p. ix.
- ² Nagel (1977), p. 9.
- ³ It is of some interest to note that the same goes for research on higher education. Here you still encounter, despite a considerable improvement in the last few years, self-interested pleas in the guise of scholarship.
- ⁴ Most accomplished work is reported in Weiss, ed. (1977). For a glimpse of some of the ongoing work in the U.S. context, see the journal Evaluation, Special Issue, 1978, pp. 38-40.
- ⁵ See, e.g. Johnson (1971).
- ⁶ Overviews can be found in e.g. Packenham (1976), pp. 237-240 and Orlans (1973), pp. 199-203.
- ⁷ For example, Caplan et al (1975) found that their 204 interviewees, all high-level federal officials in the United States, could cite 575 instances where they had used social science knowledge.
- ⁸ For a review of some of the so-called blue-ribbon commissions in the U.S., see Lyons (1975). The most recent work in that vein is the Study Project on Social Research and Development within the National Research Council. For their summary report, see National Research Council (1978).
- ⁹ For a discussion of economics, see e.g. Orlans (1973), pp. 204f.
- ¹⁰ Frankel (1976), esp. pp. 13f.
- ¹¹ See e.g. Rose (1977), esp. pp. 28ff.
- ¹² Packenham (1978), p. 247.
- ¹³ Gouldner (1970).
- ¹⁴ See in particular Dror (1971).
- ¹⁵ Freeman (1975). It was found that the sinners were largely the research institutions operating on a commercial basis.

- 16 Orlans (1973), esp. Chapter 1. It is often argued, and it seems plausible, that since the early 1970s large shares of academia have turned more conservative in the U.S.
- 17 See, for example, Packenham (1978), p. 240.
- 18 Aaron (1978), p. 9.
- 19 This is an argument typical of the blue-ribbon commissions in the area. Cf. footnote 8 above.
- 20 Lynn (1978), p. 17. For another discussion, see e.g. Yarmolinski (1976), pp. 259f.
- 21 Floden & Weiner (1978), p. 12.
- 22 Lindblom (1968), p. 4. See also Nelson (1977), esp. pp. 33-36.
- 23 Lynn (1978), p. 16.
- 24 Weiss (1978), pp. 43, 52.
- 25 Price (1965), pp. 120-162, 209-269. Quotation from pp. 118, 135.
- 26 Packenham (1978), pp. 247-249.
- 27 Ibid., p. 249; Price (1965), esp. p. 137.
- 28 Ezrahi (1976), pp. 149f, 154.
- 29 Ibid., p. 156.
- 30 Horowitz (1975), p. 113.
- 31 Rein and White (1977), pp. 135f.
- 32 Weiss, ed. (1977), p. 16.
- 33 Crawford & Biderman (1969); quotation is from p. 237. See also Janowitz (1970).
- 34 Crawford & Biderman (1969), p. 236.

- 35 Weiss (1977), p. 12.
- 36 Ibid., p. 13.
- 37 Ibid., p. 14. See also Donnison (1972) for an empirical illustration.
- 38 Weiss (1976), p. 534.
- 39 Caplan et al (1975). The findings are also reported elsewhere, for instance in Caplan (1977).
- 40 Knorr (1977).
- 41 Weiss & Bucuvalas (1977). The final report will be published by Columbia University Press in 1979. See also Weiss (1976).
- 42 Rich (1977); Cf. also Rich (1978).
- 43 Cf. e.g. Weiss (1978), Rein & White (1976), and Orlans (1971).
- 44 Discussed in, for example, Packenham (1978).
- 45 Lindblom (1968), p. 23:
Ideology is a conspicuous specialized aid to the analysis of public policy...All that we mean to say here is that any even loosely organized set of interlocking generalizations or principles about social organization--or, more specifically, about politico-economic organization--is of enormous help to policy analysis; and probably it is indispensable...A working commitment, even if not dogmatic, to pluralist democracy and corporate enterprise, for example, permits a policy analyst greatly to restrict his search for policies and generally to simplify his analysis...
- 46 Cohen & Weiss (1976), p. 68. For the same insight, see Robert M. Pirsig, Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance (Bantam edition), p. 109:
The more you look, the more you see. Instead of selecting one truth from a multitude you are increasing the multitude. What this means logically is that as you try to move toward unchanging truth through the application of scientific method, you actually do not move toward it at all. You move away from it!
- 47 Aaron (1978), pp. 158f.
- 48 For a similar argument but extended to all kinds of "expertise," see Benveniste (1977), esp. p. 39.

- 49 A discussion of this function at the federal level in the U.S. is contained in Rivlin (1971).
- 50 Cohen & Lindblom (1979).
- 51 For some of the differences between the United States and Britain, see Sharpe (1977).
- 52 See e.g. Cohen & Lindblom (1979).
- 53 Blume (1977).
- 54 For a good example of the belief that analysis may do away with politics, see Lane (1966).
- 55 Cherns (1972), esp. pp. 16f.
- 56 Generally the work of Charles Lindblom should be consulted for influential writings on the policy process. A recent and interesting work is Greenberger et al (1976).
- 57 For pioneering work in this area, see Theodore Lowi's publications, e.g. Lowi (1972). Initial thoughts on the variability of knowledge utilization in different sectors are found in Schultze (1968). Cf also note 58.
- 58 Janet A. Weiss (1979), esp. p. 440.

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